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OPINIONS BELOW 
The district court's unpublished opinion can be found on pages 358-378 of the 
record. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction over this appeal lies with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) Did the statute of limitations run against appellee's claims that an oral agreement 
was entered into in 1976 to give appellee real estate? 
(2) Is there any evidence of adverse possession? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A question of law can be reviewed for correctness and a clearly erroneous 
standard of review of the subsidiary factual determination of when the plaintiff should 
have known of their alleged legal injuries. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The relevant statutory provision for statute of limitations is UCA 78-12-25 (2002) 
The relevant statutory provision for adverse possession is U.C.A. 78-12-5 through 78-12-
14. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The events of this case surround a relationship between Bernard Gomez and 
Marjean Deakin that began in 1973. (R. 319) Several years into the relationship, in 1977, 
Mr. Gomez purchased a duplex at 468 and 470 East Sherman Ave. that was titled in his 
name. (R. 316) Mr. Gomez testified that at sometime after 1977, he added his wife's 
name to the title. (Trial Transcript P. 37) In order to purchase the home, he both obtained 
a loan from a friend and a mortgage on the property. (Temporary Restraining Order 
Transcript P.32) 
Shortly after the purchase of the home, Ms. Deakin became a resident of 468 East 
Sherman Avenue, while the other portion of the duplex was occupied by various tenants 
since 1977 (R. 316). The central contention between the parties at the present date is the 
nature of the transaction in which Ms. Deakin became the occupant of the home. Ms. 
Deakin believes that the home was given to her as a gift, (R. 316), while Mr. Gomez 
contends that Ms. Deakin was to live in a portion of the home and manage the other 
portion of the duplex (Trial P. 39). 
Under either theory, since Ms. Deakin has occupied the home, she has collected 
rent on the 470 E. Sherman Ave. portion of the duplex and used those rents to pay for 
repairs and to pay Mr. Gomez's mortgage. (R. 316). The relationship between Mr. 
Gomez and Ms. Deakin continued for several years, eventually ending in 1993. (R. 319). 
During the duration of their relationship, Ms. Deakin represents that she requested a deed 
of Mr. Gomez often, but that Mr. Gomez never gave her a deed.(R. 317). 
4 
In October of 2004, Mr. Gomez enlisted a real estate agent to sell the Sherman 
Avenue duplex, titled in the names of Mr. and Mrs. Gomez. Id. After conversations with 
both the real estate agent and Mr. Gomez, (Temp. Rest. Order P. 93), Ms. Deakin filed an 
action to quiet title against Mr. Gomez (R. 1-16). 
The lower court found Ms. Deakin the prevailing party under two of the six causes 
of actions alleged in plaintiffs complaint. (R. 322) First, that she was entitled to the 
property under Quiet Title/Adverse possession pursuant to U.C.A. 78-12-5 through 78-
12-14 and U.C.A. 78-40-1 et seq. Second, that she had prevailed under a theory of 
detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel. (R. 322) From this judgment, the defendant 
filed an appeal on October 11, 2005. (R. 416-17). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the lower courts ruling enforcing an oral agreement that 
gave title to appellee because the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations 
and the evidence does not support adverse possession. This case is based on an alleged 
oral agreement between the parties in 1978 that gave appellee a home owned by 
appellant. However, enforcement of the agreement is barred by the statute of limitations. 
In order to enforce an oral agreement, the action must be brought within four years. The 
statute of limitations for a cause of action begins to run when the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action arises. It is not necessary that the party know that a legal 
cause of action is associated with the relevant facts. 
Ms. Deakin's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations because it seeks 
to enforce an oral agreement. In order to enforce an oral agreement, she must have 
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brought her cause of action within four years, or by 1982. All elements necessary to 
prove a cause of action were present in 1978. She knew Mr. Gomez had gifted her a piece 
of real property, that she had accepted it, and that she had not received a deed after 
repeated requests of Mr. Gomez. 
In order to sustain a cause of action for adverse possession, the possession must be 
actual, adverse, exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed 
possession for a period of seven years. Moreover, the legal titleholder must be put on 
notice of the adverse claim. 
The findings of fact in this case do not support a conclusion of adverse possession. 
The element of adverse was not met. Moreover, Mr. Gomez was not placed on notice that 
she intended to hold the property adversely. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND IN MS. DEAKIN'S FAVOR 
BECAUSE HER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND BECAUSE A CONCLUSION OF ADVERSE POSSESSION IS 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS. 
A. Ms. Deakin's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations because the 
events surrounding her cause of action occurred in 1978. 
The statute of limitations barred recovery in this case after 1982. The statute of 
limitations begins to run when the last event necessary to complete the cause of action 
arises. Burtkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235 (1998); Cheves v. Williams, 993 P.2d 191 
(1999); Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (1997). 
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When a child was abused by a priest in the 1970's, but did not file a cause of action 
until after 2000, the court found that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 
Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 104 P.3d 646, 652 (Utah App. 2004). The court 
articulated the general rule "[t]hat a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action." (Court quoting Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). The court also noted that "mere ignorance of 
the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations." Id. Because the victims were aware of all facts necessary to constitute a 
claim during the limitations period, the statute of limitations had run. 
Moreover, the statute of limitations continues to run if a cause of action has arisen 
even if there is no knowledge that the events lead to a legal cause of action. In the case of 
a wrongful death suit, the court noted that "the mere ignorance of the existence of a cause 
of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." Myers, 635 P.2d at 
86 
As is similar to the Colosimo case, the events surrounding this suit occurred many 
years ago, beyond the statute of limitations. (R. 316) Moreover, the events necessary to 
create a cause of action occurred many years ago. Whereas, the injured parties in the 
Colosimo case could have filed a cause of action prior to the running of the statute of 
limitations, so could the parties in this action. According to Ms. Deakin's recollection of 
the events, Mr. Gomez gave her the home as a gift. (R. 316) She asked him for the deed, 
and after many years of requests, he did not give her the deed. (R. 317) Within a 
reasonable time period after requesting the deed and not receiving it, Ms. Deakin could 
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have sued Mr. Gomez for enforcement of the promise. However, she did not. She waited 
until almost thirty years later, well beyond the limitations period. (R. 1-16) 
As an exception to the "last event necessary" rule, the courts have articulated some 
exceptions where a discovery rule may be applicable. In the case of Burkholtz, the court 
articulated as follows: 
"The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three situations in which the discovery 
rule applies: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in situations 
where the plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has 
prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
Burkholz, 972 P.2d at 1237 (quotations and citation omitted)." 
The first situation is when the discovery rule is mandated by statute. There appears 
to be no application of that situation to this case. 
The second situation where the discovery rule applies is where the plaintiff does 
not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or 
misleading conduct. The courts have further limited this to be concealment of facts 
necessary to bring a cause of action. "Even if Defendants somehow concealed facts 
related to their knowledge of abuse, those facts would not require application of the 
discovery rule because they would not reveal any facts necessary for Plaintiffs to bring 
their claims." Colosimo, 104 P.3d at 653. 
The third situation in which the discovery rule is applicable is the presence of 
exceptional circumstances. The court notes that "[b]efore a period of limitations may be 
tolled under the [exceptional circumstances] version[ ] of the discovery rule, an initial 
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showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have 
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within 
that period. Burkholz, 972 P.2d at 1237 (second and third alterations in original) 
(quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted). 
In applying the discovery principles outlined in Burkholtz, the Colosimo court 
found that regardless of defendant's actions, if the plaintiff "at some point during the 
limitations period, ha[d] knowledge of the facts underlying his claim." Burkholtz, 972 
P.2d at 1237. In applying, the court articulated that "[e]ven if Defendants somehow 
concealed their knowledge of [priest's] abuse, those fact would not require application of 
the discovery rule because they would not reveal any facts necessary for Plaintiffs to 
bring their claim." Colosimo, 104 P.3d at 653. 
Like in the Colosimo case, Mr. Gomez did not conceal any facts necessary for Ms. 
Deakin to bring her claim. According to her recollections, she knew she had received a 
gift. She knew she had accepted the gift, and most importantly, she knew she had not 
received a deed despite her requests. These were all the facts necessary to sustain a cause 
of action. No facts have evolved since that time period that affect the ability to bring a 
cause of action. 
The third option does not apply in this case because not only could she have 
reasonably discovered the facts necessary, she already knew the facts necessary to file a 
cause of action within the limitations period. 
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B. The lower court erred in concluding that Appellee acquired the home through 
adverse possession. 
The conclusion of law based on adverse possession is unsupported by the facts. In 
order to meet the elements of adverse possession, there must be actual, adverse, 
exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession for a period of 
seven years. U.C.A. 78-12-5 though 14. 
As titled, adverse possession seems to denote a threshold consideration as to 
whether the possession of the property is adverse. In the case of a property dispute 
between a current and former titleholder, the court articulated that "one who claims 
adversely must be able to show possession such that the legal titleholder is put on notice 
of his claim." Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980. 
There is no evidence to support any elements of adverse possession. The 
conclusion of adverse possession is inconsistent with the contention and finding that the 
house was a gift. According to appellee's account of the events surrounding this case, Mr. 
Gomez gifted her the duplex. (R. 316) Under either Ms Deakin's representation of the 
events and the courts finding or Mr. Gomez's claim that she was to be the property 
manager, the possession was not adverse. Ms. Deakin could not hold a property adverse 
to Mr. Gomez when she believed she owned the home. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the lower court's judgment, finding no cause of action 
exists due to the running of the statute of limitations and the lack of evidence supporting 
a finding of adverse possession. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
7 7 JAM£S H. DEANS 
v / Attr\rr\f*\r fr\r A«i-\p>11 ctrttc Attorney for Appellants 
May 5, 2006 
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WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
MARJEANA.DEAKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARD GOMEZ AND RAMONA GOMEZ 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFF 
Case No.: 050100573 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
The above referenced case came before the Court for a bench trial on February 25, 2005. 
Present at trial was Plaintiff Marjean A. Deakin (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff) 
represented by and through her counsel, Christian W. Clinger, and Defendant Bernard Gomez 
(hereinafter referred to as Defendant Mr. Gomez), represented by his attorney, James Deans. 
Defendant Ramona Gomez (Mr. Gomez's wife) failed to appear at any of the hearings or the 
trial, but was properly a party to this action and was represented by Mr. Gomez's counsel. 
Hearings on Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were 
held in November and December 2004. The evidence admitted therein was stipulated 1o be 
admitted for the purpose of the bench trial. After the initial issuance of the Court's Findings, 
Conclusions, and Order in April 2005, Defendants moved that an amendement be made thereto 
addressing Defendants' statute of limitations contentions. Argument on the Defendants' motion 
was heard on June 3, 2005. These Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Order are issued in 
response thereto. 
The Court has heard and received the parties' stipulations of fact, the testimony of 
various witnesses for the Plaintiff and the Defendants and has received into evidence the 
following exhibits from the parties: 
Plaintiffs Exhibits and Evidence 
1. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Love letter and pictures from Defendant to Plaintiff 
2. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, Love letter and pictures from Defendant to Plaintiff 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 1 
4. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Notarized letter from Defendant transferring car to Plaintiff 
5. Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, copies of cancel checks evidencing mortgage payments from 1980 to 
2004 
6. Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, Mortgage statement showing balance 
7. Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, Receipt and payment for new water main line 
8. Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, compilation of receipts for repairs and improvements to the duplex paid 
for by Plaintiff 
9. Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, November 2004 Eviction Notice 
10. Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, copy of October/November 2004 mortgage payment 
11. Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, Notice to show house 
12. Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, copy of lease from Plaintiff 
13. Plaintiffs Exhibit 13, copy of lease between Plaintiff and Tralaye Procelle 
14. Plaintiffs Exhibit 14 copy of audiotape of messages left on Tralaye Procelle's voicemail at 
work and at home, produced with these Initial Disclosures. 
15. Plaintiffs Copies of checks to Mortgage company for December 2004 mortgage and tax 
payment, January 2005 mortgage and tax payment, and February 2005 mortgage and tax 
payment. 
Defendant's Exhibits and Evidence 
1. Defendant's Exhibit 4, part of Mr. Gomez's 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns 
2. Defendant's Exhibit 5, 1984 receipt from Chris & Dick's 
3. Defendant's Exhibit 6, receipt for nails 
Based upon the parties' stipulations, testimony, and the evidence received, the Court now 
enters the following Findings of Fact: 
r r r M m x T n c rw T2 A r r AXTT^ r*r\~Kxr<x TTOTr\xTo n t ? T KWT AXXTS rvDTYDT) o 
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L In April 1977, Defendant Bernard Gomez bought the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 
I. Sherman Ave, Salt Lake City, Utah, as a gift for Plaintiff Deakin. Mr. Gomez asserted that at 
n uncertain date sometime after April 1977, he added his wife's name to the title. Though 
^aintiff agrees that the Certificate of Title speaks for itself as to the names thereon, neither a 
;opy of the Certificate of Title nor the Mortgage was offered into evidence by the Defendants as 
evidence that Mrs. Gomez's name was added to the title to the property in question. While no 
evidence was introduced on this point, Mrs. Gomez appeared in this case as a party defendant 
md was represented by counsel. There was no evidence submitted which would indicate that 
Mrs. Gomez's name was placed on the title at any time materially prior to the filing of this 
action, nor was any evidence submitted which would indicate that Mrs. Gomez ever took any 
actions of her own which were contrary to the actions of her husband in this matter. 
2. In April 1977, Mr. Gomez gave Plaintiff the keys to the duplex and gave her 
possession and exclusive control of the house. Based on the testimony of Plaintiff, Defendant 
Mr. Gomez told her the house was hers and she could do with it as she chose. Plaintiff has never 
filed a Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder since 1977. Plaintiff did file and 
record a Lis Pendis Notice and an Amended Lis Pendis Notice with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on November 8,2004, at the same time she commenced this lawsuit. 
3. Plaintiff Deakin has continuously resided and occupied the premises located at 468 E. 
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "the property"), since 1977. Since 1977, she has 
openly claimed that the duplex was hers. She has told people and held out to the public that she 
was the owner of the house. Plaintiffs brother, Ed Aho, testified at the Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing that Plaintiff has always believed that the duplex was hers, and she has always claimed 
to be the owner. Defendants have never occupied the premises. 
4. In 1977, when Defendant Mr. Gomez gave the keys, possession, and exclusive 
control of the duplex to Plaintiff Deakin, he told her to pay the mortgage on the duplex to the 
mortgage company, pay the taxes through the mortgage escrow account, pay for all of the 
improvements, pay for all of the utility bills, and so forth. Plaintiff is an unsophisticated, 
uninformed, and inexperienced person when it comes to real estate and taxes. There is no 
evidence that she was represented by counsel with respect to this property until this action was 
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commenced. JPiaintitt nas never ciaimea any acuuuuunb IUI u^ pajrmv/m. u± p*.^^^ ^vW ^ 
interest on her tax returns since 1977. Plaintiff has never reported any rental income from the 
duplex on her tax returns since 1977. 
5. Nonetheless, for 28 years Plaintiff has paid the mortgage, paid the taxes, paid for all of 
the improvements, and paid the utility bills. Plaintiff has detrimentally relied on Mr. Gomez's 
commitment for 28 years. The Court received into evidence copies of checks for at least 20 
years proving payment of the mortgage. In regard to the monies Plaintiff has received on the 
property, Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any monies she has collected for rent on the 
duplex. All monies have gone to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any 
accounting for the monies collected at the duplex. 
For 28 years, Defendants have never asked Plaintiff to send them any of the monies from 
the duplex. Furthermore, the Defendants have never asked Plaintiff for any accounting. 
6. For 28 years, Plaintiff has acted consistently with her position as owner of the 
property in regard to her paying the mortgage, the taxes, and the improvements. 
7. Plaintiff has asked Mr. Gomez numerous times for him to put the title of the duplex in 
her name as he promised. Plaintiff has followed up with Mr. Gomez in regard to putting the title 
in her name, and he has responded to her, "I'll get around to it, Babe; I'll get around to it." 
Plaintiff has never requested in writing that the Defendants send her a deed conveying ownership 
to her. Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any proposed deed for them to sign conveying the 
property to Plaintiff. The reason Plaintiff never requested in writing for such a deed was that she 
relied on Mr. Gomez's promises that he would get around to putting the title in Plaintiffs name. 
No evidence was presented which would indicate that the parties regarded the conveyance of a 
formal deed to be essential to completing the gift of the property or anything more than a mere 
formality. In fact, the actions of the parties indicated to the contrary. 
8. Mr. Gomez stopped contacting Plaintiff in about 1993, Plaintiff had not heard 
anything contrary to Mr. Gomez's commitment until Mr. Gomez abruptly informed her through 
a real estate agent on October 27, 2004, that he was planning to sell the duplex, implicitly 
indicating for the first time to Plaintiff that he was taking action inconsistent with the gift. On 
that date, for the first time, Defendant Mr. Gomez, through his agent, stated he wanted the 
property back. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 4 
9. Plaintiff has made the following improvements xo tne property, new IUUI, new 
'ater/sewer main line, new back porch and railings for 468 E., new porch railings for 470 E., 
)rn down the garages for 468 E. and 470 E., new 220 volt electrical wiring for 468 E. and 470 
;., new air conditioning units for 468 E. and 470 E., new water heaters for 468 E. and 470 E., 
Lew light fixtures and ceiling fans for 468 E. and 470 E., new carpet for 468 E. and 470 E., 
everal coats of new paint for 468 E. and 470 E., new storm doors for 468 E> and 470 E., 2 
toves and 2 refrigerators for 470 E., 2 stoves and 3 refrigerators for 468 E., and new pipes and 
Irains for clothes washers in 468 E. and 470 E. The Court received into evidence copies of 
eceipts and proof of payment of many of the improvements listed above. 
Plaintiff never requested orally or in writing permission to do any repairs. This was 
because she primarily relied on Mr. Gomez's statements that, because the property was hers, she 
vas responsible for all improvements, repairs, and the payments therefor. When Ms. Deakin did 
isk on one occasion for Mr. Gomez to provide some financial help to pay for repairs or 
improvements, it was her testimony that he refused because he told her that it was her house and 
she could do with it as she pleased. Furthermore, in regard to tearing down the garages, the 
notices from Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County to tear down the garages came to Plaintiff and 
not to Mr. Gomez. 
10. On October 27, 2004, Plaintiff learned for the first time through Mr. Gomez's real 
estate agent that he was planning to sell the duplex in question. 
10. Plaintiff- not the Defendants - has rented the other side of the duplex for at least 
the past 28 years. Plaintiff is currently in a lease with Tralaye Procelle. 
11. On November 22, 2004, two weeks after this action was filed, Ms. Procelle received 
several telephone messages from Mr. Gomez and his daughter. They both instructed Ms. 
Procelle to send her monthly rental payment to Mr. Gomez and not to pay Plaintiff. There was 
no evidence that such a request had been submitted to this or to any other tenant prior to 
November 22, 2004. 
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DEFENDANT HAS ADMITTED THE FOLLOWING FACTS THROUGH HIS AJNS W1LK 
AND ADMISSIONS: 
12. In 1973, Plaintiff met the Defendant, Bernard Gomez, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
13. In 1976, Mr. Gomez had talked a lot about improving Plaintiffs living conditions 
and getting her out of her rental apartment. He wanted Plaintiff to have abetter quality of life. 
14. Mr. Gomez admitted that from 1977 to the present, there has never been any 
understanding or conversation between him and Plaintiff that Plaintiff was in a lease agreement 
with Mr. Gomez for the duplex in question. 
15. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never had a lease agreement from 1977 to the 
present with any tenant in 470 E. Sherman Ave. 
16. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never personally collected any rent from the duplex. 
17. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never paid any of the property taxes for the duplex 
in question. 
18. Mr. Gomez admitted that for at least the past ten years the monthly mortgage 
invoices and tax notices have been sent to 468 E. Sherman Ave. 
19. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never paid for any of the following improvements or 
repairs: new roof, new water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings for 468 E., new porch 
railings for 470 E., torn down the garages for 468 E. and 470 E., new 220 volt electrical wiring 
for 468 E. and 470 E., new air conditioning units for 468 E. and 470 E., new water heaters for 
468 E. and 470 E., new light fixtures and ceiling fans for 468 E. and 470 E., new carpet for 468 
E. and 470 E., several coats of new paint for 468 E. and 470 E., new storm doors for 468 E. and 
470 E., 2 stoves and 2 refrigerators for 470 E., 2 stoves and 3 refrigerators for 468 E.,- and new 
pipes and drains for clothes washers in 468 E. and 470 E. 
20. From 1993 to the present, Plaintiff has not seen Mr. Gomez. They have had very 
limited telephone contact. 
21. Prior to the commencement of this action, the monthly mortgage invoices and the 
annual payment and interest notices were mailed to 468 E. Sherman Ave. 
22. Neither Mr. Gomez nor Mrs. Gomez have ever lived in or occupied the duplex. 
23. For nearly 28 years, Plaintiff has leased 470 E. Sherman Ave. without any restraint 
or objections from Mr. Gomez or Mrs. Gomez. 
24. Plaintiff has never been required to send ivir. uomcz mc icm UUHCUIQU uum -r # v, ^. 
Iherman, and during the past 28 years, Mr. Gomez has not asked for the ren,t. 
25. Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Plaintiff 
hat he was going to sell the house. Plaintiff did not receive any notice of legal injury prior to 
October 27, 2004. 
TESTIMONY RECEIVED 
26. Though Mr. Gomez testified that he had paid two or three monthly mortgage 
payments over 28 years, he did not remember specifically when those payments may have been 
made and he did not offer any documentary evidence of proof of such payments or their timing. 
27. Mr. Gomez testified that neither he nor Mrs. Gomez has ever paid the property taxes 
on the duplex. 
28. In regard to Mr. Gomez's tax returns, Mr. Gomez testified that he has never 
collected any rent from the property. However, he did report some rental income on his taxes 
(for the years 2001-2004), though he did not know the monthly rental amount collected. He 
merely estimated what he thought the rental income was and then reported it on those tax 
returns. No tax return evidence, however, tied the income reported therein to the property in this 
case. 
29. In regard to improvements made to the property, Mr. Gomez testified that he has not 
made or paid for any improvements to the property during at least the last ten years. He also 
testified that he did not know of the improvements made by Plaintiff during at least the past ten 
years because he has not visited the property during that time. 
30. Mr. Gomez did testify that sometime in 1984 he made repairs to the roof of the 
duplex and he offered two receipts which were received into evidence. However, the receipts do 
not identify Mr. Gomez's name and there is no proof of payment. Only one of the receipts even 
refers to the property's address, but the telephone number on that receipt is not that of 
Defendant. 
31. Prior to April 1977, and continuing thereafter until sometime prior to 1993, Plaintiff 
and Defendant engaged in a prolonged romantic relationship. During that relationship, Mr. 
Gomez gave Plaintiff a number of expensive gifts, including two automobiles and a ring. In 
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ot out of proportion to the value of the other gifts given by the Defendant Mr. Gomez to the 
laintiff 
32. In April 1977, Defendant's prior statements and prior and continuing actions led 
laintiff to believe that Defendant had also made a gift of the real property at issue in this case 
o Plaintiff, and Plaintiff acted in detrimental reliance upon those statements and actions, 
easonably believing that the property was her own property commencing in April 1977. 
33. Since April 1977 Plaintiff acted consistent with her good faith belief that the 
Defendant had given the property to her. Nothing in Defendants' actions until October 2004 
vould be contrary to such belief. 
34. For 28 years, because she believed in good faith that the Defendant had given the 
property to her, Plaintiff paid the mortgage, the taxes, other bills, and the costs of the 
improvements on the property. 
35. Acting in reasonable reliance upon Defendant's statement that he would "get 
around to" putting title in Plaintiffs name, Plaintiff never requested in writing that the 
Defendant send her a deed conveying ownership to her. In further reliance upon that assurance, 
Plaintiff continued to act consistently with her good faith belief that the property had been given 
to her by paying the mortgage, taxes, insurance, for improvements, etc. 
36. Based upon all the evidence and the Court's evaluation of the demeanor and 
credibility of Plaintiff and Defendant Mr. Gomez on the witness stand, the Court further finds 
based on clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence, that in the context of Defendant Mr. 
Gomez's actions, the extended relationship of the parties, the statements made to Plaintiff by 
Defendant Mr. Gomez in April 1977 and thereafter, and Plaintiffs consistent behavior for 28 
years, Defendant did make a gift of the property to the Plaintiff in April 1977 and the Plaintiff 
reasonably believed in good faith that such a gift had been made, and Plaintiff acted in good 
faith reliance upon that belief. Moreover, in acting upon her belief that such a gift had been 
made, the Plaintiff made valuable, substantial, and beneficial improvements to the property 
along with paying the costs of such improvements and paying the mortgage on the property for 
28 years. 
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be inequitable to the parties, and specifically to Plaintiff who, for 28 years, has detrimentally 
relied upon her good faith belief that a gift was made to her by Defendant Mr. Gomez. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the Findings of Fact as stated above, the Court now enters the following 
Conclusions of Law. 
Plaintiff has specifically alleged the following six causes of action: 1. Quiet 
Title/Adverse Possession pursuant to U.C.A. 78-25-5 through 14 and U.C.A. 78-40-1 et seq.; 2. 
In the Alternative, Unjust Enrichment pursuant to the Utah Occupying Claimant Act, U.C.A. 57-
6-1 et seq.; 3. Detrimental Reliance/Promissory Estoppel; 4. Fraud; 5. Interference with 
Contract; and 6. Violation and Contempt of Court. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff 
has prevailed on her first and third causes of action, as indicated below, it is not necessary to 
address the other causes of action. 
As set forth below, the statutory and case law elements for quiet title and adverse 
possession have been met by Plaintiff in that she has shown that she was given the property in 
question and thereafter has had actual, adverse, exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, 
and undisturbed possession for a period of seven years or greater and that she has continuously 
paid the property taxes on the property during a period exceeding seven years, and that she has 
made and paid for improvements to the property. 
1. Since 1977 to the present date, Plaintiff Deakin has paid substantially all mortgage 
payments, paid all taxes, and made and paid for substantially all improvements and 
repairs to the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendants have never paid taxes for the property or made or paid for any repairs or 
improvements for at least the past 10 years. 
3. Defendant Mr. Gomez intended to give and indeed did make a gift of the property to the 
Plaintiff in April 1977. The actions of the parties with respect to each other and with 
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gift and those actions would remove the transaction from the Statute of Frauds. 
4. With respect to Defendants and all others, Plaintiff has had actual, adverse, exclusive, 
open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession of 468 E. and 470 E. 
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah for at least the past 10 years. 
5. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez have never possessed or exclusively occupied the premises in 
question. 
6. Ms. Deakin and Defendants have never been in a lease agreement for the premises in 
question. 
7. Defendant Mr. Gomez initially purchased the property so he could make a gift of the 
property to Plaintiff. In April 1977, before changing title to the property, Defendant Mr. 
Gomez in fact gave the property to Plaintiff. As between Mr. Gomez and Ms. Deakin, 
the following matters, established by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence, 
constituted the elements of the gift: Mr. Gomez expressed his intent to give the property 
to Plaintiff, he delivered the gift by presenting to her the keys to and exclusive possession 
and control of the premises, and she accepted the keys and took exclusive possession and 
control of the property. These facts occurred in April 1977. Plaintiff believed that the 
gift occurred at that time based upon those events. Thereafter, the conduct of the parties 
over 28 years reaffirmed that the gift had occurred when Mr. Gome? advised the Plaintiff 
that the property was hers and when he continuously acquiesced in her on-going actions 
wherein she performed consistently with the occurrence of the gift by paying the 
mortgage, insurance, and taxes, collecting and keeping the rents, dealing with tenants and 
the City, and arranging for and paying for significant improvements and maintenance of 
the property. 
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upon the statements and actions of Defendant Mr. Gomez that she was the owner of the 
duplex that Mr. Gomez gave her. 
Because Plaintiff was given the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and because she has had exclusive, continuous, open, notorious, and 
adverse possession since 1977, and because she has paid all taxes and mortgage 
payments and because she has made substantial valuable improvements to the property, 
the Court concludes she is entitled under the doctrine of adverse possession to an Order 
quieting title to the property in question in her, subject to any existing mortgage balance 
and subject to any valid third-party lien. Neither Mr. Gomez nor anyone else ever took 
any action which would constitute conduct which contradicted or breached the intent to 
make a gift of the property until October 2004. Hence, no statute of limitations began to 
run against Plaintiff until that time. Because Defendants took no action contrary to 
Plaintiffs interest until October 2004, Plaintiffs continuing belief that Defendants would 
not attempt to revoke the gift was justified until October 2004. Plaintiff timely filed this 
action immediately thereafter. 
Defendants are equitably estopped from any action to revoke the gift and from taking any 
action which may be inconsistent with said gift. 
The Court concludes that Ms. Deakin is the prevailing party. As such, she is entitled to 
have the title in the said property quieted in her name and also to receive an award of her 
costs in this action pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hi view of 
the fact that no deed was recorded in favor of Plaintiff Deakin, her right and interest in 
and to the said property is subject to the existing first mortgage and' any other valid lien 
of a third party. No evidence of any such third-party lien was presented at the trial. Ms. 
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opposing counsel pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
12. The Court concludes that because Ms. Deakin has prevailed on the merits of her case, the 
$1,000.00 cash bond that she deposited with the Third District Court, Salt Lake City 
Department, in conjunction with the Preliminary Injunction Order, shall be released to 
her. 
13. No award of attorneys' fees is made at this time. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that title in and to the 
property described below is hereby quieted in and to MARJEAN A. DEAKIN, subject to any 
mortgage existing on the property as of the date hereof and further subject to any valid lien of 
any third party, but free and clear of any claim by Bernard Gomez and/or Ramona Gomez: 
Lots 53, and 54, Block 2, WASHINGTON PLACE, a subdivision of Lots 12, 
and 13, Five Acre Plat "A", A Big Field Survey, 
Together with Vi of the vacated alley abutting on the South and East. 
Tax ID No. 16-07-460-013 
Commonly known as 468-470 East Sherman Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115. 
Dated June 2_. 2005. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 6TH day of June, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the forgoing 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, to the 
following: 
CHRISTIAN W. CLINGER 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
3760 S. Highland Drive, Ste 415 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84106 
JAMES H. DEANS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
440 South 700 East, Ste 101 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84102 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
MARJEAN A. DEAKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARD GOMEZ AND RAMONA GOMEZl 
Defendants. 
Certification of Judgment 
Case No.: 050100573 
Judge John Paul K e n n e ^
 D | $ T R | g T m m 
Third Judicial CMsuict 
SEP 1 3 2005 
6y. 
SALTUKECOUj 
*1" yt?L-
Deputy Cidfk 
On June 3, 2005, the court eutered its Amended Findings and Conclusions in this matter 
and then at the same time "ordered, adjudged, and decreed" that title to the disputed property be 
vested in the Plaintiff. 
The Court signed the order on costs on July 27, 2005. The signing of that order finalized 
the district court proceedings in this matter. 
Dated 7/W /2005. 
: Paul Kennedy 
Thj/d District Court Judge 
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